Pret a Voter with Re-encryption Mixes by Ryan, PYA et al.
Preˆt a` Voter with re-encryption mixes
P Y A Ryan1 and S A Schneider2
1University of Newcastle, 2University of Surrey
Abstract. We present a number of enhancements to the voter verifiable
election scheme Preˆt a` Voter [CRS05]. Firstly, we propose a mechanism
for the distributed construction by a set of independent clerks of the
ballot forms. This construction leads to proto-ballot forms with the can-
didate list encrypted and ensures that only a collusion of all the clerks
could determine the cryptographic seeds or the onion/candidate list as-
sociation. This eliminates the need to trust a single authority to keep this
information secret. Furthermore, it allows the on-demand decryption and
printing of the ballot forms, so eliminating chain of custody issues and
the chain voting style attacks against encrypted receipt schemes identi-
fied in [RP05].
The ballot forms proposed here use ElGamal randomised encryption so
enabling the use of re-encryption mixes for the anonymising tabulation
phase in place of the decryption mixes. This has a number of advan-
tages over the RSA decryption mixes used previously: tolerance against
failure of any of the mix tellers, full mixing of terms over the Z∗p space
and enabling the mixes and audits to be fully independently rerun if
necessary.
1 Introduction
The Preˆt a` Voter scheme, presented in [CRS05], is a cryptographic voting scheme
that enables voter-verifiability: at the time of casting their vote, voters are pro-
vided with an encrypted receipt. They can then check, via a secure Web Bulletin
Board (WBB), that their receipt is accurately included in a robust anonymising
mix process. Various checking mechanisms serve to detect any corruption in any
phase of this process: encryption of the vote, recording and transmission of the
encrypted ballot receipt and the decryptions of the votes. Full details can be
found in [CRS05]. Henceforth we will refer to this version of the scheme as Preˆt
a` Voter’05.
Preˆt a` Voter seeks to achieve the goals of accuracy and ballot secrecy with
minimal trust in the system: software, hardware, officials. Assurance is achieved
through a high degree of transparency and we thus verify the correctness of the
election rather that attempting to verify the system.
This scheme has the benefit of providing a very simple and familiar voter
experience, but certain vulnerabilities and trust assumptions have been identi-
fied, see [RP05]. In this paper we present a number of enhancements designed
to counter these threats and eliminate the need for these trust assumptions.
The construction of the ballot forms presented here also enables the use of
re-encryption mixes in the anonymising/tabulation phase. This also provides a
number of advantages over the RSA/decryption mixes of Preˆt a` Voter’05.
The structure of the paper is as follows: in the next section we give the key
elements of Preˆt a` Voter’05. Section 3 summarises some of the threats to and
trust assumptions needed in Preˆt a` Voter’05. Section 4 presents the distributed
construction of encrypted ballot forms. Sections 5 and 6 describe how these
forms can be used in the vote casting process. Section 7 describes the use of
this construction for re-encryption mixes during the anonymising and tabulation
phase. Sections 8 and 9 describe the new auditing procedures required for the new
ElGamal style ballot forms. Sections 10 and 11 discuss some further extensions
to deal with more general voting methods and remote voting.
2 Outline of Preˆt a` Voter 2005
We now present an overview of the Preˆt a` Voter voter-verifiable scheme. Voters
select at random a ballot form, an example of which is shown in Figure 1.
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Fig. 1. Preˆt a` Voter ballot form
In the booth, the voter makes her selection in the usual way by placing a
cross in the right hand column against the candidate of choice, or, in the case of
a Single Transferable Vote (STV) system for example, they mark their ranking
against the candidates. Once the selection has been marked, the left hand strip
is detached and discarded. The remaining right hand strip now constitutes the
receipt, as shown in Figure 2.
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Fig. 2. Preˆt a` Voter ballot receipt
The voter now exits the booth and casts their vote in the presence of an
official. The ballot receipt is placed under an optical reader or similar device
that records the random value at the bottom of the strip and an index value
indicating the cell into which the X was marked. The receipt is digitally signed
and franked and the voter now retains this as their receipt.
Possession of a receipt might appear to open up the possibility of coercion or
vote-buying. However, the candidate lists on the ballot forms are independently
randomised for each ballot form. Thus, with the left hand strip removed, the
right hand strip alone does not indicate which way the vote was cast.
The cryptographic value printed on the bottom of the receipt, the ‘onion’,
is the key to extraction of the vote. Buried cryptographically in this value is
the information needed to reconstruct the candidate list shown on the left hand
strip. This information is encrypted under the secret keys shared by a number
of tellers. Thus, only the tellers acting in concert are able to reconstruct the
candidate order and so interpret the vote value encoded on the receipt.
Once the election has closed, all the receipts are transmitted to a central
tabulation server which posts them to a secure WBB. This is an append-only,
publicly visible facility. Only the tabulation server, and later the tellers, can
write to this and, once written, anything posted to it will remain unchanged.
Voters can visit this WBB and confirm that their receipt appears correctly.
After a suitable period, the tellers take over and perform a robust, anonymis-
ing, decryption mix on the batch of posted receipts. Various approaches can be
used to ensure that the tellers perform the decryptions correctly. Details of this
can be found in [CRS05].
Preˆt a` Voter’05 proposes an Authority responsible for the generation of the
entropy for the crypto seeds and prior printing of the ballot forms. Random
auditing, by independent organisations, of the forms before, during and after the
election serve to detect any attempt by the the Authority to pass off incorrectly
formed ballot forms. Later in this paper we propose an alternative approach
using on-demand creation and printing of forms and post-auditing.
The Preˆt a` Voter’05 approach has the advantage of simplicity and results in
a very simple and familiar experience for the voters: they simply register, collect
a form, mark their selection in the booth and then cast the form.
For full details of the mechanisms used in the 2005 version of the scheme to
detect any malfunction or misbehaviour by the devices or processes that comprise
the scheme, see [CRS05]. The construction of the ballot forms used here calls for
rather different monitoring and auditing mechanisms that we detail later.
3 Threats and trust models
The simplicity of the original scheme, in particular the use of a single authority
and the pre-printing and pre-auditing of the ballot forms, comes at a certain
cost: various trust assumptions need to be made. In this section we briefly recall
the threats and assumptions of Preˆt a` Voter’05 identified in [RP05].
3.1 The need to trust the Authority for confidentiality
In Preˆt a` Voter 2005, a single entity creates the ballot forms. Whilst it is not
necessary to trust this entity from the point of view of accuracy, it is necessary
to trust it not to leak the ballot form information. Clearly, if the Authority were
to leak this information, the scheme would become susceptible to coercion or
vote buying.
3.2 Chain of custody
Just as we need to trust the Authority not to leak ballot form information, we
also need to assume that mechanisms are in place to ensure that none of this
information is leaked during storage and distribution. Various counter-measures
are possible: for example, ballot forms could be kept in sealed envelopes to be
revealed only by the voters in the booth. Alternatively, a scratch card style
mechanism along the lines suggested in [RP05] could be used to conceal the
onion value until the voter reveals it at the time of vote casting. The ballot
forms would also need to be stored and distributed in locked, sealed boxes. All
of these counter-measures are rather procedural in nature and so require various
trust assumptions.
3.3 Chain voting
Conventional, pen and paper elections may be vulnerable to a style form of vote
buying known as chain voting. The UK system in particular is vulnerable. Here,
the ballot forms are a controlled resource: on entering the polling station, the
voter is registered and marked off on the electoral roll. They are given a ballot
form which they take to the booth, mark and then cast in the ballot box. In
principle, officials should observe the voters casting their form.
The attack works as follows: the coercer smuggles a blank ballot form out of
the polling station. The controls on the distribution of the forms should make
this a little tricky, but in practise there are many ways it could be achieved.
Having marked the form for the candidate of their choice, the coercer intercepts
a voter as they enter the polling station. The voter is told that if, when they exit
the polling station, they hand a fresh, blank form back to the coercer they will
receive an reward. The attack can now proceed inductively until a voter decides
to cry foul. Note that, once initialised, the controls on the ballot forms works in
the coercer’s favour: if the voter emerges from the polling station with a blank
form, it is a strong indication that they did indeed cast the marked form they
were given by the coercer.
3.4 Kleptographic channels
A further, rather subtle vulnerability can occur where a single entity is respon-
sible for creating cryptographic variables: kleptographic attacks as described in
[YY96]. The possible relevance of such attacks to cryptographic voting schemes
is described in [M. 06]. The idea is that the entity may carefully choose the
values of the crypto variables in order to leak information to a colluding party.
In the case of Preˆt a` Voter, the Authority might choose the seed values
in such a way that an agreed, keyed cryptographic hash of the onion value
indicates the candidate order. Clearly this may require quite a bit of searching
and computation to find suitable values. Note however that such an attack could
pass unnoticed: the distribution of seed values would look perfectly random to
anyone ignorant of the cryptographic hash function.
4 Distributed generation of encrypted ballot forms
Many of the above attacks stem from the fact that a single entity is able to
determine, in the sense of being able both to know and to control, the seed
values. We now present a mechanism for the distributed generation of the seed
values and ballot forms. Throughout, we will use ElGamal encryption rather
than RSA as used in Preˆt a` Voter’05 and we will work in Z∗p , p a (large) prime.
An analogous construction is possible for the distributed creation of the RSA,
layered onions of Preˆt a` Voter’05. However, as we want to introduce re-encryption
mixes at the tabulation stage, we present the construction for ElGamal encryp-
tion here. We note also that the term onion is a slight misnomer where ElGamal
terms are used but we will retain it here for historical reasons.
The ballot forms will be generated by a set of l clerks in such a way that
each contributes to the entropy of the crypto seed and this remains encrypted
throughout. Consequently the candidate list, which is derived from the seed,
remains concealed and all the clerks would have to collude to determine the
seeds values.
We assume a set of decryption tellers who hold the key shares for a threshold
ElGamal primitive with public key: (p, α, βT ). These will act much as the tellers
of the original scheme and will be responsible for the final decryption stage
after the anonymising, re-encryption mix phase. Details of the anonymising and
decryption/tabulation phases will be given in section 7.
We also assume a set of Registrars with threshold secret key shares corre-
sponding to the public key: (p, α, βR). These public keys are known to the Clerks
and are used in the construction of the ballot forms.
An initial clerk C0 generates a batch of initial seeds s
0
i . These seeds are drawn
randomly from a binomial distribution centred around 0 with standard deviation
σ. σ would probably be chosen to be of order n, the number of candidates.
From these, C0 generates a batch of pairs of ”entangled” onions by encrypting
each s0i , actually in the form γ
−s0i , under the Registrar key and the Teller key:
({γ−s0i }PKR , {γ−s
0
i }PKT ).
Expressed as ElGamal encryptions these have the form:
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Notice that, for convenience later, we have encrypted the value γ−s
0
i for some
generator γ of Z∗p rather than encrypting s
0
i directly. The reason for this will
become apparent shortly.
The remaining l − 1 Clerks now perform re-encryption mixes and transfor-
mations on this batch of onion pairs. Each Clerk takes the batch of pairs output
by the previous Clerk and performs a combined re-encryption along with an
injection of fresh entropy into the seed values. For each pair of onions, the same
entropy is injected into the seed value of both onions to ensure that these values
continue to match for each pair.
More precisely, for each pair of the batch, the jth Clerk Cj generates a new,
random values x¯, y¯ and s¯ and performs the following mix/transformation on each
onion pair of the batch:
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The x¯, y¯ denote fresh random values drawn from from Z∗p generated by the
Clerk during the mix. Similarly the s¯ values are freshly created random values
except that these are again chosen randomly and independently with a binomial
distribution mean 0 and standard deviation σ. Having transformed each onion
pair in this way, the Clerk Cj then performs a secret shuﬄe on the batch and
outputs the result to the next Clerk, Cj+1.
Thus, each Clerk performs a re-encryption mix along with the injection of
further entropy into the seed values s¯.
So the final output after l− 1 mixes is a batch of pairs of onions of the form:
{{(αxi , βxiR .γ−si), (αyi , βyiT .γ−si)} where:
xi = x
l
i , yi = y
l
i , si = s
l
i
thus:
xi = Σ
l
i=1x¯
i
etc.
The final si values will have binomial distribution mean 0 and standard
deviation σ
√
(l).
We will refer to the first onion as the “Registrar onion” or “booth onion”
and the second onion as the “Teller onion”.
For each pair, assuming correct behaviour of the clerks, the s values in the two
onions should match. We’ll discuss mechanisms to detect corruption of the forms
later. As the seed values, and hence the candidate orders, remain encrypted,
none of clerks knows the seed values and only if they all acted in collusion could
they determine the seed values. These “proto-ballot form” can now be stored
and distributed in encrypted form, thus avoiding the chain of custody problems
mentioned above. The seed values can now be revealed on demand by a threshold
set of the Registrars.
5 On-demand creation of ballot forms
The above construction of the proto-ballot forms means that the ballot form
material can be stored and distributed in encrypted form. Once registered at
the polling station, voters are assigned at random one of these forms:
onionL onionR
The voter proceeds to the booth in which they find a device that reads the
left-hand onion. In the simplest case, the secret key to decrypt the left-hand
onions could be held in the devices in the booths. Thus, the left hand onion
could be decrypted in the booth, the seed value s revealed and the candidate
order pi derived as some agreed function of s. If lodging the keys in a single
device is considered rather fragile, the left-hand onion could be encrypted under
a threshold key held by a number of registrars. The onions could be transmitted
to these registrars and a threshold set of these would then decrypt the onions
and return the seed to the booth device.
The candidate list can now be printed by the device in the booth to give a
standard Preˆt a` Voter ballot form:
Obelix
Asterix
Panoramix
Idefix
onionL onionR
As an additional precaution, the left-hand onion might be separately de-
stroyed.
The point of the paired onions is now clear: we arrange for the booth device
to see only the left hand onion and so it will not know the association of the
candidate list with the right hand, teller onion that will appear on the receipt.
Various mechanisms are possible to ensure that the booth device does not see
the right-hand onion. The scratch strip mechanism could be invoked here again
for example: the right-hand onion would be covered by a scratch strip that would
only be removed at the time of casting, or even at some time after casting. The
voter only really needs to reveal the teller onion when they come to check their
receipt on the WBB.
Strictly speaking, the lth clerk in collusion with the booth device could form
the candidate list/onion association. Elaborations of the scheme to counter the
threat of such collusion attacks are the subject of ongoing research.
6 Supervised casting of a ballot
The voter in the booth now has a “conventional” Preˆt a` Voter style ballot form
with the candidate list and the associated right hand (teller) onion. His vote
can now be cast in the usual way by marking an X against the candidate of
their choice. The left hand strip is detached and discarded and the voter leaves
the booth and casts their vote in the presence of an official exactly as described
previously. Their receipt is recorded digitally as (r, onion), where r is the index
value indicating the position of the X .
The receipt can be digitally signed and franked at this point to counter any
receipt faking attacks.
Once the election has closed, copies of the digitised receipts will be posted to
the WBB exactly as before and the voters can visit this and assure themselves
that their receipt has been correctly registered. In addition to this, a Verified En-
crypted Paper Audit Trail mechanism could be deployed: at the time of casting,
an extra paper copy of the receipt is made and retained in a sealed audit box.
This can be used to independently check the correspondence with the receipts
posted to the WBB.
7 Re-encryption/tabulation mixes
Our construction leads to ElGamal onions which appear to be well suited to
being put through re-encryption mixes. However, the form of the ballot receipts
means that this is not quite straightforward: in addition to the onion term we
have the index value, in the clear as it were. An obvious approach would be to
send the receipt terms through the mix re-encrypting the onions whilst leaving
the index values unchanged. The problem with this is that an adversary is able
to partition the mix according to the index values. There may be situations
in which this is acceptable, for example large elections in which the number of
voters vastly exceeds the number of voting options. In general it seems rather
unsatisfactory.
A more satisfactory solution, at least for the case of a simple selection of
one candidate from the list, is described in this section. We will discuss how to
achieve full mixing in the more general case in section 10.
In this case we restrict ourselves to just cyclic shifts from the base ordering
of the candidate list from a base ordering. For single candidate choice elections,
this is sufficient to ensure that the receipts do not reveal the voter’s selection.
For more general styles of election, in which for example voters are required to
indicate a ranking of the candidates, we of course need to allow full permutations
of the candidate list. Indeed, even in the case of single selection elections, it is
preferable to allow full permutations in order to eliminate any possibility of
a systematic corruption of votes. For this moment we discuss the approach of
simple cyclic shifts.
Let si be the shift of the candidate list for the ith ballot form. We can absorb
the index value r into the onion:
(αy, βyT .γ
r−si)
This gives a pure ElGamal term and the value r−si taken modulo n indicates
the voter’s the original candidate choice in the base ordering. These ElGamal
terms can now be sent through a conventional re-encryption mix by a set of
mix tellers, see for example [JJR02]. These mix tellers do not hold any secret
keys but read in a batch of ElGamal terms from the WBB, re-encrypt each of
them and then post the resulting terms in random order to the WBB. After an
appropriate number of such anonymising re-encryption mixes, (a threshold set
of) the decryption tellers take over to extract the plaintext values.
Thus, in contrast to the decryption mixes uses previously, the anonymising
and decrypting phases are separated out in re-encryption mixes.
This will yield decrypted terms of the form:
γr−si (mod p).
Now we have to extract the values r − si (mod n) to recover the original
votes. The difficulty is that r− si is the discrete log of γr−si in Z∗p so in general,
if the seed values had been drawn randomly from Z∗p , computing this would be
intractable. However, we have set things up so that the s values are drawn from
a binomial distribution so we can search the space very efficiently. We could, for
example, generate a look-up table for the logs out to some multiple of σ
√
(l).
Occasionally we will have an outlier that will require some search beyond the
range of the look-up table.
7.1 Coercion resistance and plausible deniability
The point of using a binomial distribution for the seed value is to ensure plausible
deniability or coercion resistance whilst at the same time avoiding the discrete
log problem. An alternative approach would be to bound the possible seed values
generated by the clerks to lie in some fixed range, between −M and +M say.
This would have the problem that occasionally we would hit situations in which
final decrypted r − s values would take on extreme values, e.g., r − s = −M .
In this case, an adversary could deduce that r must have equalled 0 and so be
able to link this vote value back to a subset of the receipts, i.e., receipts with
the index value 0.
Using a distribution avoids such “edge effects” whilst avoiding our having to
compute arbitrary discrete logs in Z∗p . Arguably, the adversary would be able to
assign a non-flat probability distribution to the possible r values, but as long as
no values of r can ever be eliminated, plausible deniability will be maintained.
We should also observe that even if it were possible to link a vote back to a
particular index value, this would not typically violate ballot secrecy unless this
it so happened that this identified a unique receipt, i.e., there happened to be
only one receipt with this r value.
8 Auditing the Ballot Forms
The mechanisms described above allow for the distributed generation of ballot
forms and just-in-time decryption of the candidate list and printing of the ballot
forms. This has clear advantages in terms of removing the need to trust a single
entity to keep the ballot form information secret and avoiding chain of custody
issues. On the other hand, it means that we can no longer use the random
pre-auditing of pre-printed ballot forms as suggested in [CRS05]. Consequently,
we must introduce alternative techniques to detect and deter any corruption or
malfunction in the creation of the ballot forms.
A possible approach, in the supervised context at least, is to incorporate
the two sided ballot form mechanism suggested in [Rya06] and re-introduce a
cut-and-choose mechanism into the voter protocol. Here, a ballot form would be
assigned two independent, entangled pairs of onions. One printed on one side of
the form, the other on the flip side. In the booth, on each side, the left hand
onion would be decrypted and the corresponding candidate list printed in the
left hand column. The result is two independent ballot forms, one printed on
each side, as illustrated in Figure 3.
Obelix —————-
Asterix —————-
Panoramix —————-
Idefix —————-
7rJ94K —————-
Side 1
Panoramix —————-
Idefix —————-
Obelix —————-
Asterix —————-
Y u78gf —————-
Side 2
Fig. 3. Preˆt a` Voter ballot form
Figure 3 shows the two sides of such a dual ballot form. These two sides
should be thought of as rotated around a vertical axis. Note that each side has an
independent randomization of the candidate order along with the corresponding
cryptographic values. Thus each side carries an independent Preˆt a` Voter ballot
form.
The voter uses only one side to encode their vote and makes an arbitrary
choice between the sides. Suppose that the voter in this case chooses what we
are referring to as side 2 and wants to cast a vote for Idefix. They place an
X against Idefix on side 2 and then destroy the left hand strip that shows the
candidate order for side 2. This results in a ballot receipt of the form shown in
Figure 4.
These two sides should be thought of as being rotated around a vertical axis
with respect to each other. Thus the shaded, third column of side 1 would oppose
the candidate list of side 2.
The voter makes a random choice of which side to use to cast their vote and
made their mark on the middle column against their candidate of choice and
leave the flip, unselected side blank. The left hand column of the selected side is
destroyed, and so the blank column of the flip side is destroyed. This results in a
receipt on which the candidate list for the chosen side has been destroyed, whilst
the ballot form on the slip, unselected side is intact, i.e., still has the onion value
Obelix
Asterix
Panoramix
Idefix
7rJ94K
auditable side
(remaining part of Side 1)
—————-
X —————-
—————-
—————-
Y u78gf —————-
vote encoding side
(remaining part of Side 2)
Fig. 4. Both sides of a Preˆt a` Voter ballot receipt
and candidate list. The information on both sides would now be recorded when
the ballot is cast and posted to the WBB.
This flip side can now be audited and checked to ensure that the candidate
list printed by the booth correctly corresponds to the onion value. Such checks
could be performed immediately at the time of casting to detect any problems as
soon as possible. Additionally, checks could be performed on the posted values.
In addition to such post-auditing of the dual ballot forms, we can do some
pre-auditing of the committed onions pairs. This would help pick up any mal-
functions or corruption in the preparation of the proto-forms at an early stage.
9 Auditing the anonymising mixes
In order to detect any malfunction or corruption by the mix tellers, we can
again use the Partial Random Checking approach of [JJR02]. Here the checks on
audited links will be slightly different: rather than revealing the seed information
for the layer in question, the teller is required to reveal the re-randomisation
value used to e-encrypt the select link. Auditing of the decryption tellers is
quite straightforward as we don’t need any further mixing at this stage (the
anonymising mixes will be enough to ensure ballot secrecy). The correctness
of the decryptions can thus be directly checked by simply encrypting the final
values with the public keys and checking that these agree with the initial terms.
10 Handling full permutations and STV style elections
In order to deal with full permutations of the candidate list it is not immediately
clear how to generalise the approach of section 7. As mentioned, one possibility is
to leave the index values unchanged through the mixes. This might be acceptable
in some situations but is clearly not satisfactory in general.
One solution is simply to have one onion for each candidate position. For a
single candidate selection the ballot receipt would in effect simply be the onion
value against the chosen candidate. This feels rather inelegant and inefficient in
terms of multiplying up the number of onions required.
For a ranked voting method, in which the voters are required to place a rank
against each candidate, a ballot receipt would now comprise n pairs of rank value
and onion. Each of these pairs could be put through the mix separately with the
rank value unchanged (allowing the adversary to partition the mix according
to the rank values seems not to matter). This approach works fine as long as
the voting method does not require a voters rankings to be kept grouped for
tabulation, as with STV for example.
11 Remote voting with Preˆt a` Voter
The encrypted ballot forms proposed here would appear to be adaptable to
remote voting. We could for example, use a protocol like that described in
[ZMSR04], to transform left-hand onions encrypted under the registrars’ public
key to terms encrypted under an individual voter’s public key. The protocol of
[ZMSR04] achieves this without having to reveal the underlying plaintext (seed)
in the process. A pair of such ballot forms could be supplied to each voter in
order to mimic the cut-and-choose mechanism described above. Details of such
protocols are the subject of ongoing research.
Any remote voting scheme must face problems of coercion. A possible ap-
proach to counter such threats is the use capabilities as proposed in [JCJ02].
The possibility of using such a mechanism in conjunction with Preˆt a` Voter
2005 was explored in [CM05]. Voters are supplied with capabilities that are es-
sentially encryptions of a nonce and a valid string. Votes are cast along with a
capability and these go through the mix alongside the ballot terms. They emerge
from the mix decrypted. A valid capability will decrypt to a valid plaintext. The
validity or otherwise of the capability is not apparent until it is decrypted. As
a consequence, a voter who is being observed whilst casting their vote has the
possibility of deliberately and surreptitiously corrupting their capability. As long
as the voter has some window of unobserved access to system he can cast his
vote with his valid capability.
12 Conclusions
We have proposed some extensions to Preˆt a` Voter 2005 to counter vulnerabilities
identified previously:
– Authority knowledge of ballot form crypto variables.
– Chain of custody threats.
– Chain voting attacks.
– Kleptographic channels.
The new version of the scheme counters these threats by enabling the dis-
tributed construction of encrypted ballot forms by a set of clerks. As a result,
only a collusion of all the clerks could determine the cryptographic seed values.
This eliminates the need to trust a single entity to keep this material secret and
prevents Kleptographic attacks.
Our construction results in ballot forms in which the cryptographic seed
values remain encrypted and can be decrypted on demand. Thus, the ballot
forms with the candidate ordering can be created and printed in the booth, so
eliminating chain of custody and chain voting threats.
The new construction uses ElGamal encryption and so is better suited to
using re-encryption mixes for the anonymising/tabulation phase. Earlier work
on robust ElGamal mixes may be found in [JJ01,Nef01,GJJS04]. The rather
special representation of the ballot receipt in Preˆt a` Voter, index value plus
cryptographic onion, means that it is not entirely straightforward to send such
terms through a re-encryption mix. We have shown how, for single candidate
selection and cyclic shifts of the candidate list at least, the ballot receipts can
be transformed into pure ElGamal terms and so are adapted to re-encryption
mixes. We have indicated how the approach may be generalised to deal with
alternative electoral methods.
This version of the scheme is, we believe, technically superior to the 2005
version in that it requires less trust assumptions and is more robust against a
number of threats. On the other hand, from a socio-technical point of view, it
may have certain disadvantages. The voter experience is a little more complex,
in particular the need for the cut-and-choose element on the voter protocol,
which could have usability implications as well as opening up possibilities of
“social engineering” style attacks, [KSW05]. Thus, it is possible that, for some
situations like general elections perhaps, in evaluating the trade-off between the
trust assumptions of Preˆt a` Voter 2005 and the usability issues of this scheme,
the former might be deemed more acceptable.
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